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Thinking about Defence Intelligence: Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, Denis Capel-Dunn, Kenneth 
Strong and the Joint Intelligence Bureau as foundation for the Defence Intelligence Staff. 
 
Abstract 
The Defence Intelligence Staff’s closest relative was the Joint intelligence Bureau. The 
Bureau was created in 1946 as part of the post war reorganisation of the intelligence 
machinery, consolidating a number of wartime organisations. It was a centralised 
organisation, providing defence intelligence to customers in the armed forces and 
government. The Bureau was founded with the objective of implementing several 
lessons that had been identified in the Second World War concerning the organisation 
and management of intelligence. This paper examines the particular lessons the 
Bureau’s founders and its leader had learned, and the ideas they sought to ingrain in 
the organisation. It asks what kind of foundation the Bureau provided for the DIS, 
when it merged with the service intelligence directorates in 1964.  
 
‘To sum up, I think that all DMI’s suggestions are a result of the old, and to my mind indefensible 
error, that is frequently to be found in the War Office, and sometimes to be found in the other Service 
Ministries to-day, namely that a distinction can be drawn between military and other intelligence. 
Now that we are dealing with total war, there are very few aspects of intelligence that can be so 
neatly pigeon-holed.’ 
Denis Capel-Dunn, 20 February 19451 
  
Since 1964 the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), renamed Defence Intelligence (DI) in 2009, has 
provided all source ‘intelligence assessments, advice and strategic warning’ to the government and 
armed forces.2 It is not the first British organisation to fulfil this role. The history of British 
intelligence is littered with organisations that were established to provide the military and policy 
makers with various manifestations of what we now consider defence intelligence. The need for 
intelligence came with fighting imperial wars and maintaining imperial peace. There was a tradition 
of officers on ‘shooting leave’ gathering economic, topographic, and military intelligence for the 
defence of India, and of enterprising officers establishing intelligence sections in response to military 
failures, partly attributable to poor intelligence.3 But there is an equally long tradition of running 
down developed intelligence capability. Six departments, whose primary function was to supply the 
Army and War Office with topographical and statistical intelligence about foreign countries, rose and 
fell between 1803 and 1906. Time and again it was forgotten that intelligence, as much as any other 
part of the national defence machinery, needs to prepare for war during peace. Britain established 
its secret services in 1909, but consistently failed to establish a permanent all-source defence 
intelligence capability for the age of empire or for the age of the two World Wars.  
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Owing to the slow, stuttering pace of establishing a British defence intelligence organisation, neither 
DIS nor DI traces its lineage back to the pioneers of British military intelligence and their 
organisations, men like Thomas Jervis, who established the Topographical and Statistical 
Department in 1854, or Henry Brackenbury who, in 1887, headed the Intelligence Branch as the first 
Director of Military Intelligence.4 Instead, DI’s website and the various editions of ‘National 
Intelligence Machinery’, the British government’s concise guide to the intelligence bureaucracy, 
trace its ancestry to 1946 and the creation of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB).5 The JIB 
consolidated several intelligence organisations that had been established for the Second World War. 
It was a centralised organisation, supplying military and civilian customers with national intelligence 
assessments on subjects of inter-service and defence policy relevance. It became the national 
authority on topographic, economic, scientific, and, eventually, atomic intelligence. It was also an all-
source agency, processing the product of the secret intelligence machinery and gathering its own 
osint. Before it merged with the service intelligence directorates to form the DIS in 1964, it was, as 
one Ministry of Defence (MoD) official described it, a ‘factory for churning out intelligence’.6  The JIB 
was established under Major General Kenneth Strong, who became the first Director General of 
Intelligence in 1964. So it was the DIS’s most immediate ancestor, both in terms of function and 
management. It was a significant break with the past, and its establishment was the result of the 
dedication of a small number of officers. This paper explores the philosophy of the Bureau’s 
founders and its leader, Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Chairman Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, 
Secretary to the JIC Denis Capel-Dunn, and Kenneth Strong.  It examines the effect these men’s ideas 
about the management of national intelligence had on the development of the Bureau. And it asks 
what kind of foundation the JIB provided for the DIS? 
 
From World War to Cold War: The JIB’s founders, their ideas, objectives and achievements  
Kenneth Strong noted in his autobiography that the JIB was the ‘first attempt at the unified handling 
and objective analysis of intelligence need by more than one government department.’ It was, he 
argued, ‘a tacit acknowledgement that the military strength of a potential opponent cannot be 
calculated only on the basis of such obvious factors as numbers of divisions, aircraft or ships. We had 
learned from bitter experience that military strength depends on economic, geographic, 
psychological and other factors’.7 This was a clear truth in the age of total war, and in several 
respects it is surprising that it had not been institutionalised before the Second World War. It is 
equally surprising that even after the war the concept of unified intelligence, embodied in the 
nascent JIB, faced determined opposition from sections of the military and intelligence 
establishment.8 Two men, in particular, can be credited with recognising the need for such an 
organisation in peacetime, for overcoming objections, and for driving its creation: JIC Chairman 
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, and Secretary to the JIC Denis Capel-Dunn. Both men cut their teeth in 
the wartime intelligence bureaucracy. Their concept for the post war intelligence machinery was the 
foundation for British defence intelligence. Their ideas are examined below.   
The wartime intelligence establishment had grown in rather an ad-hoc manner, and, despite the 
growing prominence and authority of the JIC, it lacked a single, central controlling body. Sigint and 
deception, for example, lay outside the JIC’s remit. By the summer of 1943 it was clear that the 
machinery would need reorganising for peace. Eventually, there were several investigations into the 
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post war role of Britain’s various intelligence agencies.9 But the most significant with regards 
defence intelligence was the report commissioned by the JIC in 1943, penned over the course of 
1944, and presented to the Committee in January 1945.10 It was titled ‘The Intelligence Machine’.  
The main author of ‘The Intelligence Machine’ was Denis Capel-Dunn. He remains something of a 
mysterious figure. Before the war he enjoyed a brief career in the diplomatic service, was 
commissioned in the Territorial Army, and in 1938 departed government service for the Bar.11 He 
was drawn into the world of intelligence assessment ‘because of his drafting abilities’, according to 
former JIC chairman Percy Cradock.12 As well as acting as the JIC’s secretary he headed the Cabinet 
Office’s Joint Staff Secretariat, which placed him at allied conferences in Moscow and Yalta, and 
occasionally as secretary for Churchill.13 He died on the return journey from the United Nations’ 
inauguration. Those who remember him portray an energetic administrator, and an ambitious man. 
He devoted considerable energy to improving coordination between civilian and military intelligence 
staffs. 
Working at the JIC, with its focus on collegiality and all-source assessment, clearly influenced Capel-
Dunn’s ideas about the principles that should govern British intelligence in peacetime. His time at 
the heart of British intelligence coincided with a profound development in the power and authority 
of the Committee, and a clear demonstration of the merits of centralised organisations, staffed on 
an inter-service and civilian basis. The Committee itself, after an uncertain beginning, developed into 
a respected authority on enemy capabilities and intentions, supporting the Chiefs of Staff and the 
War Cabinet with strategic intelligence assessments.14 Below the Committee, several other 
organisations demonstrated the merits of centralisation. Capel-Dunn underlined two in a briefing 
note on the developments in inter-service cooperation during the war, the Joint Intelligence Staff 
and the Intelligence Section Operations.15 Both organisations reported to the JIC; the former drafting 
reports on enemy intentions for the approval of the Committee, and the latter a ‘clearing house for 
factual intelligence of all kinds.’16 Both had good wars; both they and the JIC embodied principles 
worth preserving and, if possible, expanding. 
Therefore, for Capel-Dunn and several others, the war had underlined the importance of ‘jointery’, 
and, indeed, of a national intelligence machine rather than disparate departments. With the support 
of Cavendish-Bentinck he went on to examine the problem for the future, and as early as April 1943 
was prepared to make recommendations for the future of British intelligence. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, centralisation was a clear theme. ‘At present’, he noted, ‘the information thus 
collected [by the services intelligence agencies and the secret services] is collated separately by 
“country sections” in the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare, Special Operations Executive, and the Political Warfare Executive.’ He went on 
to note that each of these departments believed it required information ‘for its own special 
purposes and, therefore, employs its own separate staff to study and interpret it’. And how, if the 
matter was not sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the national analysts in the 
JIS, it was entirely possible for different departments to proceed with different assessments of the 
same topic. This would not do for peace. He stated ‘I can see no reason why in future a central 
organisation both for the collection and collation of all intelligence should not be established.’ This 
would be all-source, and the raw intelligence would be processed by an inter-service staff. The 
benefits would be manifest in terms of economy, manpower, and efficiency.17 
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Capel-Dunn’s idea was in line with his general ideas regarding the management of British defence. 
He was firmly set against reverting to the 1930s and the Committee on Imperial Defence system, 
which lacked permanent coordinating and management structures. After the war, Britain needed 
what he termed ‘a living organisation’, reporting to the Minister of Defence. This needed to be 
unified to prevent a ‘situation in which the Services speak with different tongues and responsibility 
for Imperial Defence in divided both politically and administratively’. The model he had in mind was, 
he noted, ‘something on the lines of the German high command’.18 Judging by the disquiet caused 
by the creation of the JIB and the services’ doubts over motives and effectiveness of the Ministry of 
Defence there can be little doubt that Capel-Dunn’s 1943 ideas were too revolutionary to be 
implemented. However, he pursued the principles ruthlessly, countering proposals for post war 
systems that reinforced service departments rather than the central machinery.  
This included countering the early ideas of Geoffrey Vickers, Deputy Director of economic 
intelligence at the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Vickers, like Capel-Dunn, was considering the 
future of British intelligence and the role of his own department. He circulated his ideas on the 
subject in May 1943. He argued that there was a clear need to maintain and develop Britain’s 
economic intelligence capability. He believed the principal strategic target of modern weapons of 
war, the bomber and the guided missile, was ‘inevitably’ the war economy. And these weapons 
would continue to be used in conjunction with the more conventional weapons of economic war, 
the blockade and the embargo. Britain would be subject to such campaigns, and would also wage 
them. To be effective, they had to be based on sound economic intelligence.19 Capel-Dunn 
concurred with the requirement, but disagreed with Vickers’ proposed solution, which he 
characterised as ‘a small body of perpetually changing officials’ reporting either to the Foreign 
Secretary or the Minister of Defence. ‘The fact is’, he noted, ‘that the future of economic intelligence 
after the war cannot possibly be considered apart from the future of the intelligence organisation as 
a whole.’20 He urged the JIC Chairman, Cavendish-Bentinck, to discourage Vickers from circulating his 
ideas any further. A move in any direction from the central machinery would have constituted a 
retreat. 
Capel-Dunn could have been in little doubt that his recommendations to Cavendish-Bentinck would 
be received sympathetically. Perhaps owing to their years together on the JIC, driving its 
development, they were bound to absorb and then espouse similar principles. Like Capel-Dunn, 
Cavendish-Bentinck was not as an intelligence man by training. He had served with the Army during 
the First World War, but this was only an interruption to a career in the diplomatic service. He chose 
to Chair the JIC instead of a posting as head of the Egyptian and African Department of the Foreign 
Office; ‘he felt it was likely to give him more scope and to be more interesting.’21 His management of 
the JIC during the war demonstrated the deft touch of a career diplomat and a talent for resolution 
with the military members, who were generally his senior, often prickly, and characterised as ‘a 
group of individuals’ rather than collegiate.22 His most significant achievement was persisting with 
the Committee through its dysfunctional days and ensuring its maturation into an authoritative body 
that was respected by the Chiefs of Staff and Prime Minister. This has been described by his 
contemporaries as his ‘greatest contribution to British intelligence in particular, and to the war effort 
in general.’23 But Cavendish-Bentinck’s Chairmanship also exposed him to the strife and inefficiency 
of a system where individual services and departments would often pursue their own interests 
regardless of the overall cost in economic or efficiency terms. His biographer notes the Chairman’s 
disapproval of a wartime episode where he happened upon ‘junior officers in the intelligence 
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divisions of the Air Ministry, War Office, and the Admiralty all doing the same job, writing the same 
things, gathering the same information, most of it not secret in any way’.24  
Capel-Dunn has been characterised as the ‘ideas man’ behind the post war central intelligence 
machinery and the JIB. He drafted ‘the Intelligence Machine’, as well as several other memoranda on 
centralising intelligence that later bore Cavendish-Bentinck’s signature. Former JIC secretary Michael 
Herman notes that the JIC Chairman ‘added authority and common sense.’25 But there is ample 
evidence that Cavendish-Bentinck was a man of his own mind, a powerful advocate for maintaining 
the principles embodied in the Cabinet Office intelligence machinery and expanding them after the 
war in pursuit of efficiency, economies, and effectiveness. Those who admired his management of 
the JIC consider his views on intelligence to have been ‘ahead of their time’ in at least three 
respects. First, his observations of the relative inefficiency of the service intelligence staffs 
persuaded him that a centralised system was necessary. This belief was, no doubt, the source of his 
support for enhancing the role of the JIC as Britain’s senior intelligence body, and for the 
establishment of the JIB. Second, and perhaps owing to his background in the diplomatic service 
rather than the secret services, he appears not to have been overawed by spies and excessive 
secrecy. There was no question that secret work should continue – the well placed agent and the 
work of Britain’s code-breakers were often invaluable – but lower grade agents were less useful, 
often providing what could be gathered by normal research. Cavendish-Bentinck believed that 
straightforward research from non-secret sources should be encouraged. It was more efficient and, 
crucially, easier to disseminate. He had realised that the extremely high level of secrecy that some 
seemed determined to apply to all intelligence products often undermined the consumers’ 
confidence in those very products. Third, he realised that Britain would be equalled, and inevitably 
overtaken, as an intelligence and military power by the United States. After Pearl Harbor he ‘had put 
his experience in British intelligence unreservedly at the disposal of the Americans’, and later urged 
them to develop a central system to bypass inter-service rivalry in intelligence. International 
cooperation, particularly with the US, would have to be a hallmark of British intelligence practice 
after the war.26 His subordinates on the JIC did the early running on the future shape of the 
intelligence machinery. But, as is demonstrated by his correspondence with Capel-Dunn, he was 
drawn into discussions on the post war machinery soon after they started. As victory neared and the 
tempo of the war dictated that intelligence departments, like the intelligence branch of the MEW, 
dwindled in terms of their wartime usefulness and could be absorbed by other departments of state, 
it was inevitable that his influence in the debate grew, both to give it some order and help shape it 
according to his own ideas. 
The principle that the JIC should consider and discuss the post war intelligence organisation was 
agreed in 1943. In August, Cavendish-Bentinck noted to the Committee that his principal concern 
was that the intelligence machinery survive the war, and suggested some ideas for its future form.27 
Thereafter, a good number of reports were requested of the various agency heads who sat on the 
JIC; some were produced, some apparently not. But there is no mention in JIC minutes of an 
agreement to commission a comprehensive report into the central intelligence machinery.28 The 
reference in the introduction to the ‘Intelligence Machine’ to the JIC’s ‘invitation’ to produce a 
report may refer in reality to a self-invitation. The investigation seems very much to have been a two 
man affair. (In explaining to David Petrie, MI5 Director General, the purpose of their investigation, 
Cavendish-Bentinck referred to the ‘investigation that he [Capel-Dunn] and I are carrying out at the 
request of the Joint Intelligence sub-Committee’.29) They did, however, have the support of the 
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powerful Cabinet Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges.30 This may be a reflection of the JIC Chairman and 
Secretary’s desire to present their ideas and plans in an undiluted manner to the Chiefs of Staff, 
bypassing individual service interests. By late 1943 the service representatives on the JIC were 
broadly supportive of the principle of joint and centralised intelligence assessment in the JIC, the 
Director of Military Intelligence, Major-General F. H. N. Davidson, for example, noted that ‘no other 
sort of intelligence can fit the bill’.31 But they also pursued their own services’ interests, and their 
ideas were sometimes at odds with Cavendish-Bentinck’s objective. For example, he noted his 
doubts that the transfer of Vickers’ MEW economic intelligence arm to the Foreign Office was a 
satisfactory permanent solution. Collection of economic intelligence was of inter-departmental 
relevance and should therefore be centralised.32 And some on the Committee were undoubtedly 
wary of too influential and general a centralised organisation. They suggested that it would be far 
easier to construct a bespoke, efficient central structure at the outbreak of the next war, rather than 
endure an imposed central system, find it unworkable, do away with it, and begin again.33 This was 
as unacceptable to the JIC Chairman as it was to Capel-Dunn. If they only took one lesson away from 
the experience of the Second World War it was that they needed to prepare for war in peace.   
The report Cavendish-Bentinck and Capel-Dunn presented to the JIC in January 1945 was a clear 
statement of the principles they believed should govern the management of British intelligence. It 
began with a clear indictment of the services’ attitude to intelligence in the 1930s: ‘In the War Office 
in peace time there was no separate Directorate of Intelligence, and in the Air Ministry the peace-
time intelligence organisation was, frankly, not impressive’;34 ‘In the Army, at any rate, intelligence 
was a dangerous branch of the Staff for an ambitious officer to join.’35 To their concern, other than 
at the Admiralty, there was no guarantee that this situation had fundamentally changed. ‘Indeed’, 
they noted, ‘it would be foolish to pretend that even now, in the sixth year of the war, intelligence 
had not many critics.’36 Therefore, the most fundamental principle they stated was that intelligence 
had to be valued and prioritised as a national asset in peace as well as war: ‘it cannot win battles, 
but if it is absent or faulty, battles may easily be lost.’37  
The questions naturally arising from the core principle of preparation in peacetime were how this 
intelligence should be produced and delivered, and which principles should govern this process? The 
wartime machine had produced intelligence of great value, but it tolerated duplication and 
inefficiencies. Cavendish-Bentinck and Capel-Dunn noted ‘there were, no doubt, excellent reasons 
for the decisions that led to this state of affairs’, and continued, ‘It may well have been right under 
the pressure of war to avoid any dislocation that any attempt at rationalisation would have caused.’ 
However, only ‘goodwill and the national genius for making the best of anomalies, has produced 
remarkably good results from this strange machine.’ Something simpler and more economical was 
needed for peace.38 The second set of principles for the post war machinery were, therefore, set as 
rationalisation and economy. These would best be maintained in a centralised structure. Few, the 
report argued, would question the benefits of the inter-service cooperation that had developed over 
the war: ‘We believe that no Department, however experienced and well staffed, has anything to 
lose by bringing the intelligence directly available to it to the anvil of discussion and appreciation 
among other workers in the same field’.39 
To best embody these principles the post war intelligence machinery required certain 
characteristics: the agency best suited for the collection of a particular type of intelligence should do 
so; if possible, no two agencies should collect the same intelligence from the same source; material 
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collected should be collated with other material bearing on the same subject; information should be 
disseminated to those with an interest in it. The machine should be controlled by a strong inter-
service and inter-departmental body, representing the needs of producers and consumers of 
intelligence.40 Bearing these points in mind, Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck proposed a ‘certain 
amalgamation of existing inter-service and inter-departmental bodies so as to provide a central 
intelligence agency.’41 Departmental individualism was a problem; centralisation, economy, and 
inter-service cooperation were the solutions.  
In terms of the overall management of the community they, predictably, recommended the 
maintenance of the JIC. More innovative was their solution for the problem of inter-service 
intelligence. Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck proposed the ‘Central Intelligence Bureau’. 
Somewhat underdeveloped in January 1945 – the question of the future of economic intelligence 
remained unanswered – it nonetheless bore the key hallmarks of their experience and ideas with 
regards intelligence, in particular an emphasis on gathering and processing open source 
intelligence.42 The Bureau was discussed at the JIC in March 1945; its creation was approved in 
principle, with details to be debated by a sub-committee.43 By June ‘Central’ had given way to ‘Joint’, 
and the Chiefs of Staff were informed that this was a major component of the post war plan for the 
intelligence machine.44 This idea, and the concepts it embodied, was the foundation for the Joint 
Intelligence Bureau and British Cold War defence intelligence.  
The Bureau was responsible for absorbing and continuing the work of the pre-war Industrial 
Intelligence Centre and the wartime intelligence functions of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the 
Inter Service Topographic Department, and the Intelligence Section (Operations). This made it 
responsible for collecting, assessing, and appreciating intelligence material of inter-departmental 
relevance. In keeping with Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck’s goals, it was an economising and 
rationalising organisation. Without it, they argued, ‘additional staffs would be needed in the Service 
and other Ministries, to do the same work less efficiently’.45 JIB implemented several lessons the JIC 
had identified in its review of wartime intelligence.46 The primary lesson being that before the war 
Britain before the war lacked ‘an adequate machine, on an inter-service basis, for collating and 
appreciating intelligence for defence purposes’.47 Its architects intended the JIB to remedy this by 
studying a broad range of subjects in peace, both in preparation for future war and to support the 
national intelligence machinery. It would utilise the product of the secret intelligence services, but 
would not be limited by secret sources. It was given the responsibility for collecting, processing, and 
integrating open source intelligence with secretive materials. It was a national agency, not be 
beholden to the services; its Director would sit on the JIC with service intelligence directors. It would 
be funded through the Ministry of Defence vote. The JIC would set its priorities.48 
The JIB was somewhat dilute when compared to Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck’s original 
proposal. The structure could not be too centralised, nor could the individual service directorates be 
dissolved. The services retained their intelligence staffs, and retained responsibility over intelligence 
for subjects of primary interest of their department. JIB also retained more of a service flavor than 
its founders would probably have wished, judging by their analysis of the questionable record of the 
services during the war. The approved JIB design was staffed mainly by civilians. But it could not be 
too civilianised, lest the civilians fail to satisfy the services’ requirements. This was to be ensured, the 
JIC noted, by having a director or deputy-director ‘on the active or retired list’ and ensuring that a 
healthy cohort of the staff were former officers.49 This, indeed, transpired with the initial cohort of 
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JIB employees. It was directed by Major-General Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower’s former intelligence 
man. His deputy was Martin Watson, a MEW veteran. Below them, the senior staff had ample 
military pedigree: Allan Crick had served with Strong at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force; Arthur Fawssett, who headed the JIB’s Central Division, dealing with the USSR, was once 
described by Marshal of the Royal Air force, Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris as ‘the best intelligence 
officer he had ever known’; and Peter Earle had worked on Field-Marshal Montgomery’s staff.50  
Nevertheless Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck had achieved a considerable measure of success 
in integrating their core principles of efficiency, economy, centralisation, preparation, and national 
intelligence into the post war machine. It was, as Herman succinctly notes, ‘a brave step in the right 
direction’.51 They had inspired an organisation that would collect and collate intelligence bearing on 
defence for all interested departments. Its Director sat on the JIC with the service intelligence 
directors, ensuring that the national intelligence body received an input on a wide variety of subjects 
from a body concerned with defence interests, rather than individual service considerations. And it 
was an organisation that attempted to do away with an unhealthy obsession with secrecy. Capel-
Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck had noted in ‘the Intelligence Machine’ how a great deal of relevant 
material had been ‘mined from unofficial intelligence’, and how they regretted seeing this go to 
waste in peace. JIB was designed to remedy this. This openness was reflected in the organisation’s 
public profile after it set to work on 12 June 1946. Its founding was noted in the newspaper of 
record, The Times.52   
 
Carrying the Torch: Kenneth Strong, Intelligence and Government 
Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck may have lay the foundation for the JIB but they did not play a 
significant role in its development. Cavendish-Bentinck was replaced as JIC Chairman in 1945 and 
was posted as British ambassador to Poland; Capel-Dunn died in a plane crash in July of the same 
year. The man generally associated with the Bureau is its first and only Director, Major-General Sir 
Kenneth Strong. A redoubtable figure, and respected intelligence talent, he nurtured the nascent JIB 
from a minnow into a capable and useful component of the British intelligence machine. By the time 
his organisation was merged with the service intelligence staffs to form the DIS in 1964, he had 
worked tirelessly to maintain the founding principles of the organisation, and apply his own. This 
section introduces Strong’s ideas on intelligence, illustrates their similarity to Cavendish-Bentinck 
and Capel-Dunn’s, and how they became ingrained in the organisation.  
Unlike Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck, Kenneth Strong was an intelligence man before the war. 
He was an Army Officer, commissioned in the Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1920. His first intelligence role 
was in Ireland. He had no formal training, but developed a network of agents and stirred the IRA to a 
point that they threatened his assassination. This experience germinated a fascination with 
intelligence and Strong soon sought similar work. The first opportunity he found was in the 
Rhineland. He learned German to gain the posting, which he took in 1926. He went on to work at the 
Staff College and in the War Office at MI 14, German Intelligence. In 1937 he was posted military 
attaché to Berlin. His most significant wartime intelligence role was as Eisenhower’s intelligence 
man, heading the intelligence staff at Allied Force Headquarters. There he worked closely with the 
American staff, including General Walter Bedell Smith, the future Director of Central Intelligence, 
and General Eisenhower. At the General’s side he was privy to many crucial wartime events, 
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including Overlord, Marked Garden, the Ardennes offensive, and Germany’s surrender.53 These 
formative years had underlined for Strong key principles about the operation of intelligence and its 
relations with policy, principles he became determined to apply to his Cold War posting.  
The first principle was centralisation. This grew from two lessons he had identified. The first 
regarded his experience of working with single service intelligence staffs in the 1930s and during the 
war. Their tendency to be insular and ignore information at odds with their preconceptions had led 
to serious difficulties. Good intelligence entered the system, but was often undermined by analysts 
and technicians imbued with ‘not invented here’ syndrome. Clear evidence that the Germans used 
one machine-gun for both light and heavy roles failed to impress technical staffs; the ‘surprise’ in 
1940 that anti-aircraft guns were used in anti-tank roles was entirely needless.54 This occurred 
because intelligence was not prioritised, not specialised, and a poor cousin to operations. The armed 
forces’ intelligence culture did not necessarily promote continuity or the development of deep 
expertise. Professionalisation was necessary to develop a new culture that respected intelligence.  
The second lesson related to the realities of modern warfare and defence intelligence. As Strong 
noted, ‘we had learned from bitter experience that military strength depends economic, geographic, 
psychological and other factors’.55 Total war required the mobilisation of nations, so intelligence had 
to study nations as a whole; this was best done centrally, on an inter-service basis.56 His philosophy 
on centralisation is summarised in his oft-quoted passage: ‘ the speed and complexity with which 
military, political, economic, scientific and social factors can interact, and the rapidity of social and 
political chance, make completely anachronistic the type of intelligence-estimating machinery that 
leans heavily on elaborately insulated departments studying specialist fields of human activity. 
Modern conditions demand integration and professionalism.’57 He accepted the JIB Directorship, 
against the advice of some friends and colleagues, because he believed that for increased economy, 
efficiency and influence further integration of the service staffs was a clear necessity. As he noted, ‘I 
hoped to preside over such a process of integration; the JIB was the beginning.’58  
The second principle was internationalisation. Working with fellow attaches in pre-war Germany, 
and leading an international staff during the war, had convinced Strong that managing the increased 
intelligence burden efficiently and economically in the age of global threat could only be 
accomplished through cooperation. The most obvious vector of cooperation was with the United 
States. He left Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe keen on retaining connections with the 
Americans with whom he had worked so closely. And he observed the establishment of the CIA with 
enthusiasm, considering it an organisation with vast resources and redoubtable leadership, ‘one of 
the main defensive barriers of the West.’59 But he also saw great potential in the other English-
speaking powers. Indeed, according to Christopher Andrew he was ‘almost obsessed with 
Commonwealth collaboration.’60 Burden sharing was key for maintaining economical services, but 
also for exploiting expertise on a global scale. As the JIC underlined to the Australians, in 
encouraging them to establish their own Joint Intelligence Bureau reporting to JIB London, 
‘considerable advantages will accrue to both you and ourselves and a further link in the 
commonwealth defence organisation will be forged’.61 In this respect, of course, Strong’s philosophy 
was in keeping with the general thrust of British intelligence which was focused on ensuring the 
continuity of advantageous wartime arrangements, especially in sigint.  
The third principle concerned limiting unnecessary secrecy in intelligence work. He was convinced 
that the bulk of defence intelligence could be gathered more or less openly, and remained 
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unconvinced about the value attributed glamorous secret agents. As Eisenhower’s biographer notes 
of Strong, ‘Whilst training intelligence officers during the Second World War he was keen on 
dispelling any “Hollywood” ideas his men harboured regarding intelligence work, highlighting that it 
was more a scientific matter than a cloak and dagger affair.’62 At the root of this principle were two 
observations. First, that excessive secrecy of the intelligence product often had a detrimental effect 
on its impact as it limited its circulation, often absurdly. ‘Intelligence’, Strong noted, ‘is meant to be 
used.’63 Second, that intelligence needed to understand societies as a whole, and that much of the 
information required for this was openly available. What it required was expert analysis and a robust 
organisation that could deliver it to customers, not a silver bullet from a spy. Strong’s formative 
experience in this regard was the confused state of British intelligence at the outbreak of World War 
Two, and the perceived surprise at German tactics. Several aspects of the surprise were 
unnecessary; a huge amount of relevant information had already been gathered in London. The 
problems were in analysis, organisation, and communication. This belief let to his insistence that 
intelligence work should be the responsibility of experts and civilian professionals, not necessarily 
military officers on rotation; the economist had as much to offer to the defence of the realm as the 
soldier. In applauding Cavendish-Bentinck’s attitude towards secrecy, and the foundation in the JIB, 
Strong reiterated that certain aspects of operational work required great secrecy; what was ‘not so 
sensible is to allow this aura of secrecy to spill over into matters which are in much less need of 
protection.’64 
 
Strong’s Key Achievements 
Strong Directed the JIB for eighteen years. There can be little doubt that he was an excellent choice 
to maintain and develop the organisation along similar principles to those Capel-Dunn and 
Cavendish-Bentinck sought to ingrain in the post war intelligence machinery. Fundamentally, he 
maintained similar principles. Equally important, however, was his ability to ensure the survival and 
growth of the JIB in the face of early opposition, and lead it whilst more senior figures in Whitehall 
became convinced by the merits of jointery and centralisation. His empire building, passion for 
Commonwealth collaboration, connections in the US, the respect for him in Whitehall and the 
military developed JIB into a far more heavyweight organisation than it might have been. Capel-
Dunn and Cavendish-Bentinck’s crowning achievement was to maintain the centralised machinery, 
with the JIC at its heart, and a new Bureau. Strong’s was to leave an indelible mark on the 
organisation, and indeed on the DIS that emerged in 1964. 
It is possible to examine these achievements in line with Capel-Dunn, Cavendish-Bentinck, and 
Strong’s key ideas. In terms of centralisation he achieved much, although perhaps not as much as, 
ideally, he would have liked  (after all, Richard Aldrich describes Strong as ‘a great evangelist of 
centralisation’).65 Nevertheless, the initial struggle to establish the JIB in the face of opposition from 
various quarters of the armed services as well as the Treasury was broadly successful. By the 1949 
Douglas Evill ‘Review of Intelligence Organisations’ the Bureau, which had owing to financial 
pressure been established initially on a ‘skeleton and experimental basis’, had flourished into an 
eight-department organisation, producing national intelligence on a number of key inter-
departmental areas.66 Friction with the services was under control. And it was established as 
Britain’s national authority on economic intelligence. Evill described the progress as ‘very 
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satisfactory’.67 The momentum continued throughout the 1950s as various reviews exposed 
inefficiencies in Britain’s scientific intelligence organisations. First, the Brundrett review led to the 
Bureau absorbing the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence (DSI) in 1954.68 Second, following the 
Daniel review, the Atomic Energy Intelligence Unit was transferred in the same direction.69 The 
centralisation of these subjects and organisations only reinforced the JIB’s supporters’ beliefs about 
the necessity of studying foreign targets in their entirety. For example, divorcing the study of Soviet 
atomic weapons form the study of the missiles that would deliver them was clearly inefficient and, in 
several senses, illogical. By 1964 the principle of centralisation had taken root among a great many 
senior officers and ministers, most notably Gerald Templer, Earl Mountbatten, Harold Macmillan, 
and Denis Healey. They sought to reform the defence and defence intelligence machinery with 
centralisation as a core principle. The JIB provided a valuable example of the merits of doing so.  
Second, Strong and his team had developed a fine mechanism for collaboration with international 
partners. As Cavendish-Bentinck and Capel-Dunn had realised, assessing key developments in a 
modern world that was increasingly founded on interconnectedness rather than insularity required 
cooperation. In Britain cooperation was managed by the JIC and JIB. But  international cooperation 
was equally important. One of the most significant achievements of the JIB’s architects was the 
construction of a Commonwealth network of JIBs and effective liaison with the US. These 
relationships were of different character. The liaison with the Australian and Canadian JIBs was 
exceptionally close. Indeed, these organisations were created, with a significant input from London, 
to function as a global system.70 As was explained to US officials in 1949, ‘when intelligence is 
required on foreign countries or Commonwealth territories falling within the areas of responsibility 
assumed by the Commonwealth JIB’s, JIB (London) will obtain such intelligence from its Dominion 
counterparts’.71 JIB Melbourne, for instance, was responsible for observing developments in Chinese 
science and missiles. The relationship with the US was extremely valuable although, strictly speaking, 
it was not as entrenched. The JIB and the various US intelligence agencies duplicated each other’s 
work, but they cooperated closely on a variety of issues including the Soviet economy and Soviet 
missiles. With regards the latter, a JIB missile specialist noted in 1956 that ‘there had been a full 
exchange of raw intelligence material on this subject between the US and UK’, before going on to 
criticise the assumptions US analysts applied to their assessment.72 In several senses, the exchange 
summarises why the relationship was valuable for the British and the Americans: it pooled 
information, but gave critical perspectives on both communities’ judgements. Strong’s triumph was 
developing and utilising these relationships. He was most anxious to preserve them as JIB morphed 
into DIS. 
The third achievement was the institutionalisation and maintenance of an open source capability for 
defence and national intelligence. Both Capel-Dunn and Strong believed that information gathered 
through general research could be extremely valuable. The former noted that ‘in war-time, much 
valuable information is drawn from this mine of unofficial intelligence. In peace-time, however, 
much of it is wasted as far as the Government machine is concerned.’73 He believed the Bureau 
should rectify this situation: JIB was tasked to use ‘the existing machinery for obtaining secret 
intelligence and [to]… obtain through channels of its own, where existing channels are inappropriate 
‘overt’ intelligence below the grade secret.’74 Strong agreed, and worked to turn theory into 
practice. Soon after being confirmed in his position as Director he commented on the valuable 
wartime intelligence that had been gathered from businesses with German contacts and stressed 
the importance of exploiting similar sources for the Cold War.75 One of the JIB’s earliest activities 
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was to distribute an extensive questionnaire to British embassies and consulates, requesting basic 
information about the host country. This information was the basis for the JIB’s exceedingly detailed 
‘country handbooks’. In compiling its global port surveys in 1947 its main priority was tapping the 
information already available in the India, Foreign, Burma, Colonial and Dominions Offices, as well as 
the Ministry of Transport.76 It absorbed from SIS the responsibility for monitoring open sources to 
compile and maintain an index of Soviet scientists in 1947.77 The volume of material at JIB’s disposal 
was such that Douglas Evill recommended that JIB’s Central Division receive more staff to process 
it.78 A survey of the JIB’s products in all major areas of its work from the late 1940s and early 1950s 
reveals a considerable input from open sources, including surveys of global ports and beaches, 
Soviet and Chinese airfields, the Soviet economy, and nuclear weapons programmes.79  
In processing this material the JIB fulfilled two vital functions: first, it gathered and collated a far 
broader range of intelligence related to military planning than had ever been accomplished before in 
peacetime. A considerable amount of its work in the early 1950s involved preparing target studies 
for the RAF, and analyses of the vulnerability of the Soviet economy for the JIC. A considerable 
amount of open source intelligence contributed to both areas of research. The JIB was implementing 
a crucial lesson identified from the Second World War, prepare for war in peace. Should war have 
occurred the services would have received better intelligence support than in 1939. Second, it 
ensured British policies with a bearing on defence were supported by intelligence in a more 
comprehensive manner than would have been possible before the war. Its support for British 
economic containment demonstrates that in some important senses it had transcended its role of 
supporting inter-service requirements and was operating as a national defence intelligence centre.80 
Its mission, funding, and staffing prevented it from developing into a fully-fledged all-source 
intelligence centre, like the CIA, but the development of a culture of processing and applying osint 
set a strong foundation.  
Strong’s fourth achievement in the JIB was to lay the foundation for a culture of professionalism and 
expertise in defence intelligence. Aside the Royal Navy, the services had consistently failed to create 
a culture that valued intelligence and intelligence officers, despite the clear demonstration of its 
merits in conflict. (Strong himself was, of course, an accidental intelligence officer with no formal 
training.) The war had illustrated that civilians were capable of generating intelligence for the 
services, and also generated many excellent intelligence officers. Strong was determined that this 
experience be retained and developed if the JIB’s goals of providing inter-service and national 
intelligence on such a wide variety of subjects was to be achieved. Working with Edward Bridges, the 
Cabinet Secretary, he gained the Prime Minister’s approval to waive the normal civil service 
recruiting procedure to retain as many experts as possible.81 His staff eventually included 
‘economists, engineers, geographers, scientists, and doctors.’82 As Herman notes, ‘it recruited the 
young civilians who later became the backbone of the defence intelligence staff.’83 
The development was not without difficulties. One challenge was that the opportunities for 
progression and progression for expert analysts remained limited. By the 1960s there was an 
imbalance in the ranks. The JIB’s Intelligence Officers (IOs) were divided into three categories IO (I), 
(II), and (III) – IO(I) being senior. In 1961, there were more IO(II)s than entry level IO(III)s.84 According 
to JIB’s Deputy Director, Martin Watson, this was because the JIB had not been designed with a 
‘sound’ promotion structure and instead had evolved to meet the demand of the workload.85 IOs 
were generally specialists in a particular field and were unlikely to be promoted outside that field.86 
13 
 
In 1961 the JIB was examining a proposal designed to solve the problem that promotion prospects 
differed from section to section by ensuring that an IO was automatically promoted from IO (III) 
after ten years of service. Strong claimed the problem of stalled progression was alleviated, partially, 
by his success in securing a good rate of pay for his IOs. Another challenge involved competition with 
the service intelligence staffs, which persisted in questioning the primarily civilian analysts’ capability 
and competence in assessing military developments and technologies. This became increasingly 
apparent with the development of Soviet ballistic missiles and the JIB’s increased involvement in 
assessing the threat. Nevertheless, maintaining a permanent cadre of intelligence officers and 
subject matter experts ensured a consistency in the JIB’s output and a base of expertise that was 
difficult to maintain in sections of service intelligence, where officers continued to rotate every three 
years. In 1960 Gerald Templer, in his study of service intelligence, was in little doubt that the 
professionalism of the JIB was a model to which the services should aspire.87 And expanding the 
number of professional staff and a professional ethos remained a central objective for Strong, 
Mountbatten, and Denis Healey when they created and developed the DIS. 
 
A Foundation for the Future 
The JIB was established to remedy several of the deficiencies of the pre-war intelligence machine for 
the difficult post war years. Its founders noted a requirement for a centralised, inter-service and 
civilian organisation supplying customers with national intelligence. The service intelligence agencies 
had proven themselves unable to establish a culture of valuing intelligence or intelligence offices in 
peace, and some doubted its value even after the experience of the war. Capel-Dunn and Cavendish-
Bentinck believed that the post war organisation should function according to the principles of 
preparation, cooperation, and exploitation of all source intelligence – that intelligence should be 
considered a national asset, just like the military. The organisation that emerged in 1946 was not 
precisely the one they had imagined in 1945, but it was a positive development in British defence 
intelligence: it ensued that certain key principles were institutionalised, and then developed, and 
over the following eighteen years it supplied valuable support to customers across government.  
JIB was probably the right organisation at the right time. Centralising military intelligence wholesale 
was an impractical step in 1945, despite the growing feeling in sections of the intelligence 
community that the machine would require further consolidation in the future. Intelligence was (and 
remains) a service and therefore had to remain focused on the customer. Indeed, as Strong noted it 
was ‘impracticable to carry the centralisation of intelligence further and faster than the 
centralisation of defence as a whole’.88 In 1950 he explained to the Minister of Defence, Emanuel 
Shinwell that ‘so long as the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry exist in their present form . . . 
the intelligence organisation, must in general conform’.89 Judging by the resistance that the limited 
JIB encountered, an organisation that compromised the services’ independence further may not 
have survived. Even in 1964, when Strong and Mountbatten were pushing hard for functionalisation 
in the DIS, undermining individual service identity in the organisation, they had to compromise in the 
face of stiff resistance. According to Mountbatten ‘the price of quelling the “mutiny” over 
intelligence was not to press functionalization [sic] to its logical conclusion, and in particular to let 
the three Chiefs of Staff each hold on to their two-star service director’.90  Despite his centralising 
instinct, Strong advocated evolution, not revolution. 
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Neither Strong nor any of the Bureau’s other supporters (or, indeed, its opponents) believed the 
Bureau was more than a first step. The JIB could not resolve many of the fundamental problems in 
British defence intelligence, many of which were apparent, although managed, soon after the 
Bureau’s creation. First, despite achieving a degree of rationalisation, by, for example, becoming a 
de facto national economic intelligence centre, it did not manage to eliminate duplication. JIB and 
the Air Ministry fought a running battle for responsibility over assessments of the Soviet missile 
threat throughout the 1950s.91 This underlined a second problem, that one of the Bureau’s key 
weaknesses was its inability to establish itself as a national authority and assert that authority over 
the service intelligence directorates. Despite working cooperation in many areas, one of the services 
concerns over centralisation and conceding responsibility to JIB was that civilians lacked the 
necessary understanding of military issues. In 1945, at the Bureau’s founding, the Chief of Air 
Intelligence noted how ‘we intend to off-load into the Bureau as many subjects as possible whilst 
retaining complete control of what might be termed “Air” matters of purely operational importance 
to the Air force.’92 In 1961, in response to the Templer report’s support of centralisation, Sidney 
Bufton claimed that that no Chief of the Air Staff would go to war ‘unless the defence which they 
had to penetrate had been analysed and estimated with all the technical and professional skill 
available to the Royal Air Force’. He doubted whether the First Sea Lord or the CIGS would go to war 
with forces ‘designed to meet a committee “threat” with which they disagreed’.93 Herman notes that 
some viewed the Bureau as a depository of ‘retired officers studying obscure subjects that might 
become useful sometime’, rather than as a real intelligence asset.94 Capel-Dunn had recognised the 
dangers of such insular mind-sets in 1945 and sought to reform them. Perhaps the key failure of his 
reforms was that they did not create a culture of ‘national intelligence’, other than in the JIB itself. 
Intelligence officers in the Service directorates’ retained loyalty to their parent service. Creating such 
a culture became one of Strong’s primary objectives as he managed and reformed the DIS through 
1964-1966; he realised that it was vital for a truly efficient and integrated service.95   
These problems reflected a tension in the structure of the intelligence machinery. The JIB 
represented a compromise. It was an agency which the service agencies saw as a threat to their 
prerogatives, and one which the advocates of centralisation viewed as a stop gap.96 Resolving the 
problems was dependent on developing a stronger authority in the centralised Ministry of Defence. 
And achieving this required the focused intervention of determined Prime Ministers, Ministers of 
Defence, and the Chief of the Defence Staff in the early 1960s. In the meantime, Strong had to 
proceed by evolution, slowly absorbing more responsibility and gaining support. The post war 
intelligence machine was subject to numerous reviews and reorganisations, and the JIB was 
generally a bureaucratic winner. One can conclude that this was due to a number of factors: the 
influence of Strong, certainly, but more importantly the principles that he and the Bureau’s founders 
instilled and maintained in the organisation. Economy and centralisation were a sure fit for an age of 
financial discipline. Preparedness for the future was a virtue for those who cut their teeth in the 
Second World War. Perhaps most importantly, the Bureau studied its targets as total entities, linking 
the topographic, the economic, the industrial, and the scientific. Strong was correct: modern 
conditions demanded that this be done centrally and professionally.97 
Strong devoted few words in his autobiography to the JIB. He notes how he accepted the 
appointment because he wished to preside over further centralisation in service intelligence, and 
judges the Bureau ‘made a useful contribution to Britain’s national affairs.’98 There can be little 
doubt that this was the case. Throughout its existence the JIB performed a function that Britain had 
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sorely lacked between the wars: that of an all source intelligence agency. It implemented a number 
of lessons identified in the war. Primary among these was preparation. JIB officers compiled an 
impressive library of ‘British Intelligence Surveys’, which were detailed compendia of information on 
various countries that planners could turn to for operational intelligence. The first country 
handbooks focused on the USSR, Persia, and China; they were followed by surveys of Norway and 
Afghanistan.99 Over its lifespan the JIB build a substantial library of such publications.100 But the 
Bureau’s intelligence also supported and guided British policy at key junctures. This was especially so 
with regards Britain’s economic relations with the USSR and its refusal to apply trade on the same 
scale as the US, despite significant pressure from Washington.101 It remains the case, however, that 
the Bureau’s most useful contribution was not in the myriad assessments it produced, but in the 
principles it embodied. Capel-Dunn, Cavendish-Bentinck and Strong’s insistence on joint, central and 
national intelligence produced on organisation that was a major step towards the JIC’s 1945 goal ‘to 
set our house in order’.102 The Bureau was certainly not without its problems, but provided a solid 
foundation for the DIS from 1964.  
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